The move from the originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute model of lending profoundly transformed the functioning of credit markets and weakened the natural asset transformation function performed by …nancial intermediaries for centuries. This shift also compromised the role of banks in channeling monetary policy initiatives, and undermined the importance of traditional asset-liability practices of interest rate risk management. The question is, therefore, whether securitisation is conducive to the optimal hedging of bank interest rate risk. The empirical results reported in this work suggest that banks resorting to securitisation do not, on average, achieve an unambiguous reduction in their exposure to the term structure ‡uctuations. Against this background, banks with very high involvement in the originate-to-distribute market enjoy lower interest rate risk. This however by no means implies superior risk management practices in these institutions but is merely a result of disintermediation.
Introduction
The recent …nancial crisis prompted by the US subprime mortgage meltdown has demonstrated the detrimental impact a troubled banking sector has on the wider economy both domestically and internationally. The …nancial markets worldwide su¤ered disastrous losses, with massive declines in portfolio values of various, including highly rated, securities. The crisis also led to a severe liquidity shortfall that adversely a¤ected all economic agents. As credit tightened, the myriad of formally prosperous businesses were forced to …le for bankruptcy, resulting in soaring unemployment and unprecedented decline in international trade.
Securitisation is generally regarded as the key culprit in the subprime debacle, thus provoking copious discussions on possible remedies for the market for securitised assets. Recently, a plethora of contributions addressed these issues both empirically and analytically 1 . Together these works suggest that the root causes of the crisis are by no means exogenous, and reside in managers'opportunistic behaviour, propensity to short-termism, and concomitant regulatory policies that abetted these trends. Beyond this point of agreement, the issue remains an ongoing debate among academics, practitioners, and policymakers with many of the underlying causes yet to be fully understood. Interestingly, none of the aforementioned causes is new, and they have all been acknowledged as the primary determinants of the major …nancial crises in the past. Three common causes are particularly emphasised: moral hazard and information asymmetries; global imbalances; and a poorly designed multi-layered regulatory framework which further aggravated an already present misalignment of incentives.
However, what makes the current crisis di¤erent is a contagion which was manifested due to highly developed inter-linkages between international …nancial corporations, their complexity, multi-sector involvement, and a speedy transmission of news and investment ‡ows. What started as a relatively isolated US subprime mortgage episode was then propagated to the rest of the …nancial sector worldwide, a¤ecting all major asset classes. In response, a great deal of research has focused on examining the market mechanism by which the …nancial contagion is proliferated, proposing even more solutions to contain the shock spill-overs in the future (Brunnermeier, 2009; Longsta¤, 2010) .
Further contributions have also addressed the role of rating agencies, condemning their inability to properly rate the securitised products (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). Agencies' incentives, and con ‡ict of interest are also emphasised (Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2011) . The design of the compensation structure, with managers'rewards being tied to short-term mark-to-market pro…ts rather than the longterm pro…tability and solvency of created positions, has also been acknowledged for contributing to the crisis (Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2009). In a similar vein, the regulatory architecture which allowed, and in some instances abetted, such shorttermist behaviour has also been denounced (Acharya and Richardson, 2009 ).
While much has been learnt from these contributions, they have predominantly concentrated on the underlying causes of the current events, not the risks facing the …nancial system in the aftermath of the crisis. For instance, none has explicitly addressed the issue of bank interest rate exposure, the importance of which was reasserted by recent developments in the monetary environment.
Following an unprecedented reduction in the nominal interest rates, today the concern exists that banks have relaxed their asset-liability management practices and are less protected than ever against rising interest rates 2 . This concern is re ‡ected in the speech of then Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Donald L. Kohn at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Symposium on Interest Rate Risk Management in January 2010. In his speech, Dr. Kohn stressed that "... interest rate risk is inherent in the business of banking..." and "... it is especially important now for institutions to have in place sound practices to measure, monitor, and control this risk". He further cautioned that as the economy recovers, it is reasonable to expect a tightening in monetary policy, with associated developments in the entire shape of the term structure being hard to predict. In this respect, the unprecedentedly high issuance of government debt worldwide, coupled with increasing in ‡ationary pressure, may trigger sharp changes in the interest rate environment. As suggested by Dr. Kohn, it is highly unlikely that the interest rate volatilities will "...return to their previous quiescent state", thereby posing further concerns for the stability of the …nancial sector. The shape of the term structure is also likely to undergo signi…cant changes. As the investors return to higher risk leveraged positions, the yields o¤ered on sovereign instruments will have to be revisited in order to successfully …nance the …scal de…cit. Furthermore, due to the crisis-induced liquidity constraints, many institutions were forced to shorten the maturity of their liabilities and are accordingly exposed to greater re…nancing risk 3 .
And while the prudently managed companies will presumably access the required funds, the increased competition for credit may escalate its cost. On the asset side, as many households …nd the value of their debt exceeding the value of the underlying equity, the rate of defaults is likely to peak with interest rates. Such economic conditions raise the fundamental question of what are the most e¤ective and suitable ways to hedge against unanticipated developments in the yield curve. In this respect, the theoretical bene…ts of securitisation for e¢ cient management of bank interest rate risk are unambiguous. On the one hand, securitisation serves as a channel to transfer interest rate risk from the …nancial intermediary to parties better equipped to bear and manage this exposure. On the other hand, it provides an opportunity to align the duration of interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities, thereby reducing the balance sheet duration gap and concomitant exposure to interest rate movements. Further, securitisation income o¤ers the potential to improve revenue diversi…cation, thus reducing bank reliance on interest-generating activities 4 . Despite these sound theoretical grounds, no empirical account of the impact of securitisation on bank interest rate risk has hitherto been conducted. Accordingly, the objective of the work reported here is to circumvent the aforementioned issues in addressing the impact of securitisation on bank interest rate risk. In particular, the paper o¤ers three major contributions to the literature.
First, utilising an extensive sample of publically traded US bank holding companies, this work empirically veri…es the importance of interest rate exposure for the majority of analysed institutions over the 2001 to 2009 period. Nearly 95 percent of analysed …nancial intermediaries are adversely a¤ected by yield curve shocks at one time or another, with the yield curve slope being the most signi…cant source of risk. The banks resorting to asset securitisation are a¤ected to a higher degree by term-structure movements than their non-securitising counterparts.
Second, this is the …rst study which explicitly relates the level of bank securitisation activities to its interest rate exposure. While the empirical evidence to date suggests that securitisation a¤ects the level of bank credit risk, its solvency, and e¢ ciency, no empirical test to assert its impact on bank interest rate risk has been conducted. The results reported here o¤er a valuable insight to both managers and the US thrifts to their total assets was at the level of 40.6%, while the corresponding proportion of all adjustable-rate mortgage loans to total assets was at only 22.3%. The e¤ective duration gap in the thrift industry also remained positive, highlighting the …rms'susceptibility to rising interest rates. 4 As argued by Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov (2011), since activities that generate non-interest income are imperfectly correlated with those generating interest revenues, with raising interest rates, the diversi…cation of revenue sources should help stabilizing operating income and give rise to a more stable stream of pro…ts. This view is supported by the empirical …ndings of Smith et al. (2003) and Chiorazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008) .
regulators looking into securitisation to curb bank interest rate risk. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis, with the monetary policy decisions creating a unique environment for interest rate exposure.
Third, the current research also studies whether the securitisation of assets with di¤erent maturities and risk characteristics impacts di¤erently on bank interest rate exposure. The empirical tests suggest that interest rate risk generally increases with the maturity of assets securitised. To decouple the e¤ect of securitisation from other factors, I consider further channels that may have a¤ected bank risk. These include numerous bank-speci…c characteristics and the macroeconomic environment in which banks operate. Further, the research covers both pre-crisis and crisis episodes, thereby o¤ering an opportunity to compare the e¤ectiveness of securitisation in curbing bank interest rate risk between the two periods. I …nd that banks resorting to asset securitisation are subject to greater interest rate exposure in the second, crisis sub-period.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature and outlines a set of testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents a theoretical model of …nancial intermediary risk-taking behaviour, while Section 4 continues by outlining the supporting empirical framework. The description of the data sample follows in Section 5. Empirical results are discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
Literature review and hypotheses formulation
Securitisation is a relatively straightforward process of transforming a pool of illiquid assets into marketable securities via cash ‡ow repackaging; yet it has substantially reshaped the credit markets in recent decades. While originally con…ned to the US residential mortgages, today, securitisation is applied to a wide range of asset classes, including credit card, commercial and industrial, automobile, and home equity loans, among others. Since its inception in the late 1960s, the issuance of securitised assets in the US has been growing steadily to amount to nearly US $2.11 trillion as of the year end 2009 5 . 5 Aggregate of the US mortgage-related (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance, based on the data compiled by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, http://www.sifma.org. The fastest growth was enjoyed by the MBS sector, with a nearly 11.2% (15.8%) compound annual growth rate between 1996 and 2009 (1996 and 2006) . The corresponding growth rates for the US ABS issuance are -0.8% and 16.3% respectively. The declining trend in MBS is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, owed to weak house sales, mortgage loan origination, and new housing start-ups following the crisis. The number of house sales in the US has reached its peak of 1.28 On the theoretical front, access to the market for securitised products may substantially bene…t the originator by (a) allowing to e¢ ciently diversify its credit portfolio; (b) improving asset-liability management; (c) reducing the cost of …nan-cial intermediation; and (d) providing an opportunity to pro…t by specialising in operations in which it enjoys a comparative advantage 6 . As suggested by Loutskina and Strahan (2009), securitisation eases the in ‡uence of bank …nancial conditions and local funding shocks on credit supply. As a result, it increases liquidity and facilitates the reduction of funding and therefore banks'intermediation costs. Further, securitisation provides a means to e¢ ciently transfer the risk from the banks' balance sheet to other economic players better equipped to bear it, thereby removing the impediment to further growth implied by capital and balance sheet constraints. In terms of bank interest rate risk, securitisation o¤ers an opportunity e¤ectively to tailor the balance sheet duration gap induced by the banks'asset transformation function. Thanks to heterogeneity in the maturity of assets admissible for securitisation, the duration of rate sensitive assets can be perfectly matched to that of corresponding liabilities. Further, by securitising assets with embedded prepayment provisions, the lender, in e¤ect, resells the position held in these options and therefore hedges its exposure to unanticipated increases in interest rate volatility.
Despite the unambiguous theoretical bene…ts o¤ered by securitisation, the empirical evidence and the state of market predicament to date suggest that …nancial institutions may have been unable fully to enjoy such advantages. With many …rms moving from an "originate-to-hold" to "originate-to-distribute" business model, the agency problems become ever more apparent and a vast literature analyses this issue in depth (Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Drucker and Puri, 2009 ). In particular, due to the separation of asset ownership and control functions, the loan originator lacks the incentive to exert enough e¤ort in monitoring the credit quality of any pursued projects. Provided with a channel to alleviate its credit exposure, the intermediary is more concerned with the fees it extracts from the new loan origination rather than the underlying quality of these loans. As demonstrated by Keys et al. (2010) , the likelihood of originating sub-quality loans increases with the probability of the loans being sold. Furthermore, the funds released from asset shifts are commonly used to …nance more pro…table, yet riskier avenues (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Purnanandam, 2011) . And while various mechanisms were introduced to minimise moral hazard and to better align the interests of bankers and investors (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995), ine¢ cient contractual environment and misplaced regulatory and 2009 (source: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov). 6 For more insightful discussion on the bene…ts of securitisation, see Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) . e¤orts precluded a complete resolution of these problems.
Besides, under poorly designed regulatory capital charges, banks have an incentive to securitise safer, low-yield assets while retaining riskier and more pro…table ones. As demonstrated by Ambrose, Lacour-Little and Sanders (2005), intermediaries commonly securitise safer mortgages and retain the more risky ones on the balance sheet. An extensive scope of works provides further empirical evidence to support this "regulatory arbitrage hypothesis" for asset securitisation. Many also agree that even with no capital distortion, the banks are likely to shift safer assets, owed to excessive costs involved in distribution of riskier instruments due to the "lemons" problem (Akerlof, 1970) . Additionally, despite the fact that under the FASB140 rule (Financial Accounting Standards Board) securitisation is classi…ed as an asset sale, in practice, this transaction resembles a typical …nancing arrangement with securitisers commonly retaining their credit exposure by providing various credit enhancements and guarantees. For this reason, the o¤-balance sheet treatment of such transactions has been greatly criticised in the literature.
Moreover, with the increased popularity of securitised products, a myriad of nondepository market players entered the lending business directly to compete with traditional intermediaries. This translated into increased market competition, forcing many …nancial institutions to accept higher risks to remain competitive. From this perspective, securitisation is unlikely to be utilised as a risk-transfer mechanism, but is rather motivated by the desire for greater pro…tability.
On the basis of the discussion so far, and following the recent events in global …nancial markets, the possibility of banks utilising securitisation to curb interest rate risk seems rather elusive. This view is re ‡ected in the …rst testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : Banks resorting to asset securitisation face greater interest rate exposure. The extent of this exposure varies with the duration of assets securitised.
Against this background, there is evidence to suggest that in the run up to the subprime crisis banks successfully shifted a great deal of riskier assets owing to favourable monetary and regulatory conditions. This trend was majorly fuelled by a low interest rate environment, the increased market demand for securitised products, and investors' excessive reliance on credit ratings reinforced by copious regulatory provisions. This view is empirically supported by Mian and Su… (2009) and Dell'Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008). However, both papers report a pronounced decline in the lending standards associated with higher securitisation rates. The former contribution also reports a signi…cant upturn in bank "disintermediation" over the 2001-2005 period, with a substantial increase in loans sold shortly after origination.
In the same vein, many have argued that in the last decade banks have moved from a traditional spread generating strategy to a new equity-maximisation feesgenerating strategy. By assertively strengthening its involvement in the "originateto-distribute" market, many intermediaries, in e¤ect, function as brokers who extract the fees for joining borrowers and lenders. And while the asset repackaging and sale is costly to the originator, the costs associated with joining the complementary transactions between borrowers and securitised-debt investors are considerably reduced through the standardisation of securitised products. Besides, the company achieves economies of scale by specialising in structured …nance transactions. It also enjoys increasing returns to scale in evaluating the borrowers'credit quality due to lax monitoring. Furthermore, the active players in the securitisation market enjoy better access to derivative instruments which, as demonstrated by Purnanandam (2007) , enable these companies to preserve the extent of loan origination even as monetary conditions tighten.
With this business model, the importance of interest generating revenues declines, and so does the e¤ective duration of assets held on the balance sheet. Accordingly, the duration gap remains at minimal levels, and the intermediary is less exposed to the risk of changing interest rates. On the basis of this argument, the following hypothesis is added into the analysis:
The relationship between bank interest rate risk and asset securitisation is non-linear. The risk initially increases with the value of assets securitised, but declines with bank "disintermediation".
Theoretical background
The interest rate exposure represents a natural risk faced by all …nancial intermediaries due to the nature of their maturity transformation business model. In particular, this type of risk may arise from three key sources. First, by transforming the short-term savings to long-term investments, banks unavoidably mismatch the duration of the interest sensitive assets and liabilities. The "Duration Theorem" independently proposed by Samuelson (1945) and Hicks (1946) states that if the weighted duration of the asset stream is greater (less) than the weighted duration of the liability stream, the interest rate increase (decrease) will reduce the individual's net worth. With therefore a positive duration gap, measured as the di¤erence between the durations of assets and liabilities, rising interest rates reduce the value of assets more than the value of corresponding liabilities. The earlier attempt to formalise the practical applications of the proposed theory can be traced to the work of Redington (1952) who introduces the so-called "immunisation rule". Under this simpli…ed rule, the agent chooses to always hedge against interest rate shocks by matching the durations of rate sensitive assets and liabilities.
Second, when the rates earned on the underlying assets are not perfectly correlated with the rates paid on the liabilities, the bank's earnings are exposed to interest rate ‡uctuation. This is referred to as the interest rate margin risk. Following the Federal Reserve's decision to reduce the interest rates to unprecedentedly low levels, the bankers have enjoyed a substantial increase in the interest rate margins. These conditions may substantially change as the monetary policy tightens, with many banks …nding it di¢ cult to re…nance some of their …xed rate assets with variable rate liabilities. Finally, the third source of interest rate risk arises from optionality embedded in some assets and liabilities (e.g. prepayment options). This asymmetric source of interest rate risk gained its prominence in recent decades.
To theoretically formalise the aforementioned sources of interest rate risk, and to see how securitisation may be used in curtailing these exposures, this section presents the model of bank intermediation and describes its key attributes. For simplicity, the model concentrates on the banks'duration transformation function and discounts any other claim attributes and risks. Formally, I assume that the interests of shareholders and managers are aligned in their combined utility maximisation (A.1). Accordingly, the bank pursues the strategy of maximising its after-tax profits. The credit market is perfectly competitive à la Besanko and Thakor (1987) , with the credit contracts designed to maximise the expected utility of borrowers.
At each planning date t the manager can choose the amount to be invested in assets and liabilities of di¤erent maturities, conditional on her choices in preceding periods. The maturity of available projects is limited by T , which represents the manager's investment horizon. Some divergences from the target asset mix are inevitable in the short-run, though the bank's choice of principal specialisation determines the market condition it faces and its ability to promptly adjust the composition of the asset portfolio. Bank liabilities are subject to similar constraints, with relatively stable, manager controlled federal funds, though volatile deposit base. The latter contracts represent a relatively stable funding source in the presence of a deposit insurance guarantee. Assuming further that t is continuously de…ned on the closed interval [0; T ], the bank's asset and liability streams over the investment horizon are A(t) and L(t) respectively. The interest rates are stochastic and independent of the banks'choice of balance sheet structure, with the function R(t) characterising the market term structure over the interval [0; T ]. The interme-diary can nonetheless negotiate favourable rate conditions on its assets and liability contracts (e.g., spreads over index rates such as LIBOR) owing to its market power. The BHC's equity value Q is therefore simply the di¤erence between the present values of its asset and liability streams:
where the present values of asset and liability streams are denoted by A and L respectively. In a similar manner, the BHC's net income 8t > 0 is de…ned as:
where R a (t) and R l (t) are interest rates charged on assets and liabilities respectively.
For convenience, the regulatory capital charges, as well as the operational costs of servicing the asset and liability portfolios are assumed away in this speci…cation. Accordingly, following Assumption 1 (A.1) above, the bank shareholders are concerned with maximising the value of bank pro…ts:
Note that the equity value Q is una¤ected if the yield curve remains unchanged over the period; and the bank pro…ts are driven by the net interest margin. As, however, the term structure evolves, both the bank interest margin and its equity value would be a¤ected in a number of ways. The exact nature of such response is convoluted due to the direction of rate movements, the occurrence of non-parallel shifts in the term structure, and the relationships between the bank assets and liabilities rates. These considerations unnecessary complicate the model, and a number of simplifying assumptions are introduced as follows:
A.2 The shifts in the interest rate yield curve are parallel in nature: given a continuous random variable q with a probability density function f (q) 0 and a q b, the future yield curve can be described by
Accordingly, assuming R(t) = R in (3), the bank interest income remains una¤ected as long as the adjustment speed of the rates charged on assets and the rates paid on liabilities is the same:
Under this condition, the pro…ts are determined by the term-structure driven changes in the market values of the intermediary's assets (A) and liabilities (L):
It is easy to see that
and
are the weighted average time to maturity, or durations, of assets and liability streams respectively. Denoting the duration of assets with M D A and the duration of liabilities with M D L , we get:
It therefore follows that the manager's decision problem is to choose the M D L and M D A that maximise the value of bank equity Q. Assuming, however, the stochastic nature of the interest rate movements [E(q)= R b a qf (q)dq], adjusting the durations is barely an improvement over the immunisation strategy.
Since banks commonly assume a positive asset-liability duration mismatch, to reduce the sensitivity of a company's value to interest rate ‡uctuation, the risk manager must either reduce the duration of assets M D A or increase the duration of liabilities M D L . In this respect, securitisation o¤ers an elegant solution to the …rst problem, owed to heterogeneity in the assets admissible for securitisation. In particular, the lender with a positive duration mismatch can use securitisation in at least two ways to curtail its interest rate exposure: (a) it can securitise the long term-assets, such as mortgages, o¤ the balance sheet, thereby reducing the e¤ective duration gap; (b) it can securitise assets with embedded prepayment provisions and thus hedge its exposure to unanticipated increases in interest rate volatility.
Methodological framework

Yield curve modelling
The standard research methodology of assessing the interest rate exposure proposes to use a single interest rate factor (Stone, 1974) . Therefore, it fails to recognise the time-varying nature of the yield curve shape.
In this study, I account for the sensitivity of BHCs'stock returns to the changes in the entire shape of the term structure by employing simultaneously the level, slope and curvature of the interest rate yield curve. These measures are calculated via the Diebold and Lee (2006) factorisation of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model:
where represents the maturity of the underlying …xed-income security and is a decay parameter discussed below.
The Nelson-Siegel model uses just a few parameters (compared for example to spline methods) and provides enough ‡exibility to capture a range of monotonic, S-type and humped shapes typically observed in the yield curve data. It …ts the term structure using a ‡exible, smooth parametric function based on a Laguerre function. Notably, due to its ability to provide a good …t of the interest rate yield curves the model is advocated by Diebold and Lee (2006), and Czaja, Scholz and Wilkens (2010), and is widely used by central banks and practitioners. The central banks in nine out of thirteen countries members of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision construct a sovereign zero-coupon yield curve using the Nelson-Siegel class of models.
To estimate the yield curve level, slope and curvature, the series of the sovereign zero-coupon yields of 12 di¤erent maturities ( = 3, 6 and 12 months, and 2, 3, . . . , 10 years) are sourced from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board statistical releases. These series are used as the initial estimates on the left hand side.
Based on the model parameterisation above, the loading on the level ( 1;t ) parameter is 1 and is independent of time-to-maturity. Taking the limit, it is easy to see that lim !1 y t ( ) = 1;t and hence the yield curve level can be seen as a long-term interest rate variable. It also worth noting that an increase in 1;t would identically a¤ect all yields, thereby shifting the level of yield curve. Similarly, the loading on the slope parameter 2;t is driven by the exponential function starting at 1 and decreasing monotonically to zero with increasing maturity. Therefore, the slope parameter might be seen as short-term interest rate variable. An increase in this parameter would amplify the short-rates more than the long ones. In mathematical terms, given lim !0 y t ( ) = 1;t + 2;t , it is easy to see that y t (1) y t (0) = 2;t . The loading on the last parameter 3;t (curvature) is also driven by the exponential function, now starting at zero (with the = 0), increasing for the medium maturities and decaying back to zero as maturity increases. Accordingly, the yield curve curvature ( 3;t ) can be seen as the medium term interest rate variable.
Following Diebold and Lee (2006), and Czaja, Scholz and Wilkens (2010), to obtain the estimates of the level, slope and curvature, the identi…ed series of zerocoupon yields are regressed on the factor loadings and a constant using the crosssectional ordinary least squares technique. With this model factorisation the parameters on the right hand side are calculated assuming the pre…xed value of decay parameter . Consistent with Diebold and Lee, the value of the decay parameter is …xed and is chosen to maximise the loading on the curvature parameter. For comparison, the time-varying decay parameter is also employed. In this speci…cation is chosen to maximise the goodness-of-…t statistics of the underlying model at each time t. Both speci…cations yield statistically identical results. To avoid introducing an additional time-varying component in the yield-curve model, I resort to the …xed speci…cation. Figure 1 plots the estimated level, slope and curvature factors, with the pertinent statistics outlined in the corresponding table.
Compared to the yield curve slope and curvature, the level factor is less volatile. This observation is not surprising since the yield curve level serves as a proxy for the long-term interest rate, with the yields at the long end of the term structure being generally less volatile.
Interest rate exposure
To address the underlying empirical hypotheses, I follow a two-stage estimation procedure in line with previous literature in the area. In the …rst step, the interest rate exposure of BHCs' stock returns is modelled via a four-factor GARCH(n; m) parameterisation 7 of the market model formalised as:
where R it represent the weekly logarithmic returns 8 on BHC i (i = 1 to 304) for the …rm's …scal year t; is a scalar, is a K 1 vector of coe¢ cients and X it is the it-th observation on K explanatory variables: X0 = (R M ; R Level ; R Slope ; R Curvature ). R M is return on the S&P500 market index. R Level ; R Slope ; and R Curvature represent unanticipated changes in the level, slope, and curvature of the domestic sovereign zero-coupon yield curve at time t respectively. The use of unanticipated changes is advocated by previous research suggesting that asset values should already incorporate all the anticipated changes in interest rates. I estimate these unanticipated changes as the di¤erence between the actual changes in the respective factor at time t and ones forecasted via the appropriate speci…cation of the ARMA (k; l) model 9 .
" it is the estimated error term from the mean equation of portfolio i, and h it is a conditional variance of portfolio i over week t. The order of lags (n; m) ensures the adequate treatment of serial correlation in squared returns, with the formal Engle ARCH Lagrange multiplier and Ljung-Box Q-statistics determining the correct lag structure.
The estimated coe¢ cients measure the sensitivity of bank i's stock returns to changes in the considered interest rate factor. They are treated as independent variables in the empirical framework to follow.
Securitization and interest rate risk
In the second step, the estimated measures of interest rate risk are related to proxies of bank securitisation and asset sales activities. I use panel data techniques to fully exploit the potential of the data sample, and to control for unobserved cross- 8 To avoid the bias introduced by the Monday or Friday market e¤ects (French, 1980; Pettengill, Wingender and Kohli, 2003) , the calculation of returns is based on the Wednesday to Wednesday stock prices. The choice of the weekly sampling interval instead of daily or monthly is determined by two reasons. First, the …ndings of Trzcinka (1986) indicate that the returns calculated at a daily frequency are not well explained by the normal distribution. By using, however, monthly sampling frequency the non-normality of daily observation would be avoided just at the expense of information loss. Second, the use of weekly intervals reduces distortions due to non-trading holidays and noise trading. 9 For most interest rate factors, the ARMA (k; l) model is speci…ed with autoregressive (k) and moving average (l) parameters ranging from 1 to 3.
sectional and time heterogeneity. The workhorse model speci…cation accounts for both company speci…c …nancial characteristics and the overall economic and business conditions in which these …rms operate:
where, k it represents the interest rate risk measure k in year t for bank i. As discussed above, these measures represent the BHCs' equity return sensitivity to unanticipated changes in the yield curve level, slope, and curvature. is an S 1 vector of coe¢ cients and SEC it is the it-th observation on S securitisation proxies. Similarly, is an M 1 and Y it is the it-th observation on M company speci…c …nancial characteristics; while is an L 1 and G t is the t-th observation on L macroeconomic characteristics. T t is a vector of year -dummies of dimension T 1, and the company speci…c e¤ect is measured by i . The model is estimated by either treating i as …xed (…xed e¤ect model), thus assuming (N + M + L) unknown coe¢ cients, with = ( 1 ; : : : ; N )0 being company speci…c intercepts; or random (random e¤ect model). In the random e¤ect speci…cation i IID(0; 2 ) and is independent of " i IID(0; 2 " ). Further, both i and the disturbance term " i are independent of (SEC it ; Y it ; G t ) for all i and t. For both model speci…cations the robust standard errors adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are calculated.
In line with Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov (2011) and Au Yong, Fa¤ and Chalmers (2009), the absolute values of interest rate betas are used as the dependent variable in the second step regressions. This aids an economic interpretation of the estimated results and can be reconciled with the notion that both positive and negative exposures to yield curve shocks represent the risk to bank economic value and should be treated accordingly. Further, to facilitate the validation of the proposed hypotheses, various parameterisations of the baseline model are introduced through empirical investigation.
Sample selection
The dataset spans the 2001 to 2009 period and consists of the US publicly traded bank holding companies (BHC). The choice of sample period is driven by the availability of required data on BHCs'securitisation activities. I identi…ed publicly traded BHCs by cross-referencing the institutions appearing both in the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company database and in the dataset supplied by the University of Chicago's Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The requisite dataset is accordingly constructed by merging the income statement and balance sheet data from the Consolidated Financial Statement for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C form) with the equity market data from CRSP on the basis of company name and its geographical location. The equity returns are of weekly frequency, all adjusted for dividend reinvestment and stock splits by CRSP. I further check for the dataset consistency with Compustat using the CUSIP identi…er.
The focus on BHCs instead of their commercial bank subsidiaries is determined by two factors. First, the share price data is commonly available for only the BHC and not individual banks. Second, the decisions concerning the company's capital and risk management strategies are ordinarily undertaken at the highest level, and are not necessarily directed at a single subsidiary.
The banks with missing data on securitisation and asset sales activities, derivative transactions, total loans and assets, and equity capital are excluded from the sample. The same applies for the acquired entities. Every e¤ort is taken to detect and address any outliers arising as a result of measurement or reporting errors in the underlying datasets. Other non-technical representative outliers, depicting genuine variability in the considered variables, are dealt with accordingly as per the discussion to follow. This yields a total of 304 bank holding companies with the required information being continuously available across the entire sample period. The list of analysed banks is in Appendix A, while the considered variables alongside their detailed de…nitions can be found in Appendix B. For each BHC, the annual aggregates of the underlying data are used. The average value of total assets for these institutions ranges between $16,524 million in 2001 and $35,682 million in 2009, with the median for two years being $1,017 billion and $2,023 billion respectively.
Bank attributes related to securitisation and loan sales activities are from Schedule HC-S of FR Y-9C …lings. For each BHC, I measure the aggregate value of assets, by category, securitised and sold, or sold but not securitised, within a given …scal year. Additionally, the value of the outstanding principle balance of assets securitised or sold for each bank-year is also considered. The pertinent statistics on these measures, by year, are reported in Table 1 , with a detailed de…nition for each variable available in Appendix B. Evidently, the loans secured by 1-4 family residential real estate dominate securitisations and loan sales. This is followed by commercial and industrial, and credit cards receivable loans.
[Insert Table 1 here]
To account for further bank characteristics and the macroeconomic environment in which these institutions operate, I introduce two sets of control variables accordingly.
Bank speci…c control variables
There are six …rm level controls, all constructed using FR Y-9C …lings. First, given the evidence of signi…cant U-shaped relationships between bank capital and interest rate risk (Keswani, Marsh, and Zagonov, 2011), the ratio of equity capital to BHC's total assets (CAP) is deployed. It should be noted that by facilitating the diminution in regulatory capital requirements, securitisation may render the capital ratios an unreliable approximation of the true bank capital constraints. This, however, should not signi…cantly alter the importance of this factor in explaining the banks'interest rate sensitivity because the equity capital itself represents notinterest rate sensitive liability. Accordingly, …rms with higher capital levels are expected to be less sensitive to interest rate shocks.
Second, following the rationale outlined in previous works, the measure of bank liquidity (LATA) is also considered. In line with empirical literature, a positive relationship between banks' liquidity and risk is expected. Care should be taken in interpreting this variable, since securitisation may a¤ect the short-term fund in‡ows and hence in ‡ate the bank liquidity ratios. Third, the ratio of non-performing loans 10 (NPL) is used to measure the quality of the bank asset portfolio. Fourth, based on the theoretical underpinning outlined in the previous section and in line with Flannery and James (1984), the measure of balance sheet asset-liability mismatch (GAP) is calculated as the di¤erence between interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the bank's total assets. As per the outlined theory, a positive sign on this variable is expected. Fifth, since the originator commonly retains an equity-like interest in the transaction, thus maintaining its exposure to credit and prepayment risks, the bank purchase of credit protection (e.g. credit default swaps) can be seen as an attempt to hedge this exposure. To this end, I calculate the bank's net credit protection purchase (NECP) as the di¤erence between the credit protection it buys and sells in a given …scal year. Finally, to control for the e¤ect of bank activity diversi…cation, a set of asset and revenue diversi…cation measures is constructed. In line with Laeven and Levine (2007), the diversi…cation of net operating revenue (ROID) is proxied via a modi…ed speci…cation of a Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as follows:
Interest income -Non-interest income Total operating income (12) This measure assumes values between 0 and 1, with a higher value suggesting greater degree of income diversi…cation. In addition, the income concentration in both interest and non-interest revenue streams is also captured via a Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index. In particular, I consider a broad eight part breakdown for non-interest revenues (H_NOIR), and a twelve part breakdown for the interest income (H_NITR). In a similar manner, the loan concentration HHI (H_LOAN) is computed considering …ve major categories of loans. These include agricultural, commercial and industrial, consumer, real estate, and other loans. More information on the construction of all variables is given in Appendix B.
To improve the …t of the empirical model, I control for further bank characteristics that may explain the variation in the risk exposures. Namely, the return on assets (ROA) is utilised to proxy the bank operational performance and e¢ ciency, while the return on equity (ROE) is discounted in the analysis due to its deceptiveness for …rms with highly leveraged balance sheet. It may also be argued that the level of bank securitisation, as well as its risk exposure, is determined by the growth rate of its assets base. Accordingly, the asset growth rate (AGR) is added to account for this supposition. Finally, as securitisation alters the value of banks' on-balance sheet assets, the size indicator becomes less relevant (DeYoung and Rice, 2004) and it is omitted from the analysis.
To this end, Panel A of Table 2 provides key comparative statistics for the outlined measures between securitisers and non-securitisers, while Table 3 presents pairwise correlations for these variables.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 
here]
BHCs resorting to asset securitisation are larger, retain higher capital bu¤ers, and have better diversi…ed non-interest revenues, while their non-securitising counterparts excel in diversifying the interest income. Generally, securitisers seem to better balance the shares of interest and fee-generating revenues in their total operating income (ROID). Securitisers also maintain a better diversi…ed loan portfolio, which, however, seems to be of a lower credit quality as suggested by loan-loss provision and non-performing loan ratios. Further, these …rms purchase more credit protection than their non-securitising peers. This provides evidence to support the "regulatory arbitrage hypothesis" for asset securitisation discussed above. Finally, BHCs not involved in the originate-to-distribute market maintain a lower assetliability mismatch on the balance sheet, suggesting that these …rms resort to stricter asset-liability management practices.
Economic environment
In the second group of controls, the overall economic and business conditions are captured by the annual growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDPG), and the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADSI) sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia database (Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti, 2009), respectively. The latter measure accounts for the real economic activity at high frequency, on the basis of both high-and low-frequency information on six major economic indicators (i.e. weekly initial jobless claims, monthly payroll employment, industrial production, personal income less transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly real GDP). This index has an average value of zero, with progressively greater values indicating better than average business conditions and vice versa. The descriptive statistics for both …gures are outlined in Table 2 : Panel B.
To get more stable estimates in the empirical model, all considered explanatory variables ( = Y; G) are treated for outliers via type I winsorization 11 , with …xed cut-o¤ points of 4^ . Alternatively, the variables are winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, with the results being robust to the variable winsorisation..
Empirical Results
The discussion begins with the results obtained in the …rst stage estimation in Section 6.1. The multivariate regression analysis is discussed in section 6.2.
Bank interest rate sensitivities
The interest rate exposure of the analysed BHCs is assessed via a four-factor GARCH (n; m) model formalised in Eq. (8) . This model is estimated for each bank-year, with Table 4 presenting comparative statistics of estimated interest rate factors for securitisers and their non-securitising peers.
[Insert Table 4 here] At least 10% of the examined BHCs are signi…cantly a¤ected by the adverse movements in di¤erent components of the interest rate yield curve, thereby indicating the inability of risk managers to timely adopt adequate hedging strategies. Notably, while the e¤ect of interest rate shocks on the values of both securitisers and non-securitisers is similar in its magnitude, the proportion of securitisers significantly a¤ected by these shocks is appreciably higher. This, in a way, supports the …rst empirical hypothesis which argues that securitisation is unlikely to be employed as a risk-transfer mechanism.
The majority of the signi…cant interest rate factors are negative, suggesting that BHCs maintain a positive duration mismatch between their interest sensitive assets and liabilities.
Securitization and interest rate risk
For the main research hypotheses, the panel model in Eq. (11) is …rst estimated with time-and state-…xed e¤ects applied to the entire sample of BHCs. The sensitivities of equity values to unanticipated changes in the yield curve level, slope, and curvature estimated from Eq. (8) are interchangeably used as the endogenous variable in this model. The explanatory variables that control for the company …nancial characteristics, and the country economic conditions, are as discussed in previous section. All right-hand side measures are lagged to avoid simultaneity bias. When the economic environment proxies are added into the model, the time-…xed e¤ect is relaxed.
Considering …rst the intermediaries'exposure to changes in the long end of the yield curve, Table 5 : Panel A outlines the empirical results for Hypothesis 1. The proxy for bank securitisation activities (TSEC) enters the table positively and significantly at the one percent level. This implies that BHCs with a greater outstanding value of securitised assets tend to increase interest rate exposure, with this evidence providing additional support for the proposed hypothesis. This is also consistent with the view that securitisation is unlikely to serve as a risk-transfer mechanism, and is instead motivated by the desire for greater pro…tability.
[Insert Table 5 here]
To attest the second part of the hypothesis, concerning the duration of assets securitised, I aggregate securitisations by the maturity of the underlying assets into three categories: long-term (1-4 family residential mortgages), medium term (home equity lines of credit and commercial and industrial loans), and short-term (auto loans, credit card receivables, and other consumer and commercial loan and leases). Given that commercial and industrial loans commonly include short-and mediumterm lending to businesses, they enter both short-and medium-term categories interchangeably. The results, also reported in Table 5 : Panel A, are robust to either speci…cation.
It appears that increases in interest rate exposure are mainly driven by securitisation of long-term assets, which are mainly represented by residential mortgages. This is not surprising given that these type of loans dominate securitisations and asset sales, and the funds released from these transactions are likely to be reutilised to extend the loans of similar long-term maturity, yet lower quality. This is in line with the "regulatory arbitrage hypothesis", which suggests that banks commonly securitise safer, low-yield, assets and retain more pro…table, though riskier, ones on the balance sheet. This also is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Ambrose, Lacour-Little and Sanders (2005), and is further supported by the observation of higher proportion of non-performing loans and the asset-liability maturity gap measure for securitising …rms. Besides, the distribution of riskier, opaque, assets would incur a heavy discount due to the "lemons" problem suggested by Akerlof (1970) , and would introduce an impediment to the bank's external funding channel once the market participants learn about the underlying quality of securitised products.
Accordingly, the retained mortgages are subjected to greater interest rate risk, with their credit quality likely to further deteriorate as the interest rate shocks are passed on to customers (Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa, 2010).
Against this background, it can be argued that banks with high involvement in the originate-to-distribute market function more as brokers, who generate fees by matching the complementary transactions between borrowers and securitised-debt investors, than …nancial intermediaries. Under this "disintermediation" business model, the bank shifts the majority of originated loans, and, therefore, has a comparative advantage in selecting the projects most suitable for securitisation. Further, given that loans exit the balance sheet soon after origination, the e¤ective duration of assets and liabilities held on the balance sheet is short-term and can be closely matched. Given this background, the active players in securitisation markets are expected to be less exposed to the risk of changing interest rates, with this view being re ‡ected in the second research hypothesis.
To test this supposition empirically, I reformulate the model in Eq. (11) in a non-linear form as follows:
where, k it represents the stock return sensitivity of bank i to unanticipated changes in the yield curve level, slope, and curvature at year t. T SEC it is the it-th observation on the company securitisation proxy, and Y it is the it-th observation on M company speci…c …nancial characteristics. T t and i are vectors of year-and statedummies respectively.
Given the model parameterisation, I predict a negative sign on the coe¢ cient estimate for the squared securitisation proxy (T SEC 2 ), and a positive sign on T SEC variable: 1 > 0 and 2 < 0.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The estimation results in Table 6 support the hypothesised relationship, implying that interest rate risk initially increases with the value of assets securitised, but declines with bank "disintermediation". Once again, the results are driven by the securitisation of long-term assets, with non-linearity being only con…rmed for the long-term interest rates represented by the yield curve level.
In a similar manner, the remaining interest rate factors (yield curve slope and curvature) are evaluated in Table 5 : Panels B and C. For all three measures of interest rate risk the results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that banks do not necessarily resort to securitisation to curb their risk exposure. As discussed above the parameter estimate for the securitisation proxy (TSEC) enters all Tables signi…cantly positive. In this respect, the magnitudes of @IRR/@TSEC suggest a great economic signi…cance. Thus, a one percent increase in the proportion of total assets securitised translates into about 0:053 percent increase in BHCs' exposure to shocks in the yield curve level. This, in turn, would imply that a typical US securitiser will incur an additional $1:79 million decline in its market value following a typical shock in the yield curve level. The corresponding values for interest rate slope and curvature are $4:01 million and $1:17 million respectively.
Turning to the remaining bank characteristics in Eq. (11), the majority of coe¢ cients estimates are statistically signi…cant and bear the expected sign. Consistent with prior empirical research, the relationship between equity capital and bank risk taking is U-shaped. That is, both undercapitalised and well capitalised intermediaries are generally riskier than banks with intermediate, optimal capital levels. Further, the institutions with higher degree of revenue heterogeneity also enjoy lower risk exposures, and so are the companies with higher asset base growth rate. Not surprisingly, the coe¢ cient on the ratio of non-performing loans enters the table negative, owed to the intrinsic link between credit and interest rate risks (Drehmann, Sorensen and Stringa, 2010).
Robustness checks
To corroborate the …ndings from the basic model in Eq. (11), I perform a comprehensive set of robustness checks. These include the use of di¤erent time horizons and subsamples; the assumption of alternative model speci…cation and distributional properties; and an extensive treatment of endogeneity and simultaneity biases.
In the context of this study, endogeneity may arise when the BHC's decision to participate in the market for securitised products does not only in ‡uence, but is in ‡uenced by its interest rate exposure. In this scenario, the exogenous treatment of securitisation activities would introduce simultaneity bias in the regression estimates. Furthermore, additional factors may jointly in ‡uence the variability in both measures, biasing the ordinary least squares estimation and making it di¢ cult to infer causal relationship. To address these concerns, I detect potential endogeneity via a Hausman test and resort to a two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel estimation procedure by introducing a set of instruments for the BHCs'securitisation activities as appropriate. To identify suitable instruments, I address the bank's decision to securitise by analysing its …nancial characteristics in the probit framework (not reported). The results remain robust to the choice of estimation technique. Column 1 of Table 7 details the empirical output for the 2SLS regression assuming the BHCs'exposure to the shocks in the yield curve level as an endogenous variable. Although not reported, the results for the remaining interest rate proxies also remain statistically unchanged.
[Insert Table 7 here] Furthermore, caution should also be taken in isolating the risk management motives of asset securitisation from auxiliary inducements. In particular, the incentive to securitise may be circumscribed by the level of loan demand and current economic conditions. Faced with unusually high demand for loans, banks would resort to asset sales to extract higher loan origination rents, and to satisfy the existing customer demand for funds. On the other hand, weaker loan demand conditions following the economic downturn make it di¢ cult for an intermediary to successfully perform the securitisation transaction. This is due to low liquidity and demand for ABS, and higher credit risk of the underlying asset mix resulting in market mispricing. Such economic conditions would also a¤ect the level of bank interest rate exposure.
In this respect, the analysed sample period provides a unique opportunity to explicitly test this supposition by separating the time horizon into pre-crisis and crisis episodes. This also provides a comparison of the e¤ectiveness of securitisation in curbing interest rate risk between the two periods. In addition, the sample of companies is separated into a number of sub-samples on the basis of ranking by the bank's (1) size, (2) liquidity, and (3) net derivative usage (hedging -trading). Selected are the top 25% and the bottom 75% of values in each category, with a total of six portfolios constructed.
The pertinent results for these tests are also reported in Table 7 . The coe¢ -cient estimates on the bank securitisation proxy remain robust to the considered time horizon, thus recon…rming the …ndings in the previous section. Not surprisingly, it appears that BHCs are subjected to greater risk exposure in the second crisis-episode. Turning to the measure of bank size, the estimate on the securitisation proxy remains signi…cant only for the smaller companies. This might be explained by the fact that larger BHCs are better equipped to weather the yield curve shocks owed to better diversi…ed portfolios and unrestricted access to the markets for derivative products. On the other hand, these …rms might also pursue the "disintermediation" business model, therefore reducing the balance sheet duration gap and concomitant exposure to interest rate movements. Once the bank liquidity and derivative activities are considered the estimation suggests that the risk exposure is greater for the companies retaining higher liquidity bu¤ers and for BHCs which are the net traders of derivative instruments. The intermediary is classi…ed as the net-trader if the notional amount of all derivative instruments held for trading exceeds that of instruments held for hedging.
Concluding remarks
The recent turmoil in global …nancial markets, prompted by the US subprime mortgage meltdown, has once again accentuated the importance of banking sector prudency for overall economic stability worldwide. Securitisation is consensually regarded as the key culprit in the subprime debacle, with a plethora of works addressing possible remedies for the market for securitised assets. These contributions, however, are largely concerned with the underlying causes of the current events, not the risks facing the …nancial system in the aftermath of the crisis. None has explicitly addressed the issue of bank interest rate risk, the importance of which becomes increasingly apparent in the current monetary environment. This concern has been recently ‡agged by regulatory authorities both in the US and in Europe, with supervisors emphasising the necessity of establishing robust practices to measure, monitor, and control bank interest rate exposures.
In this context, the move from the originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute model of lending profoundly transformed the natural asset intermediation function performed by banks for centuries and compromised the importance of traditional asset-liability practices of interest rate risk management. Against this background, this work empirically examines the impact of securitisation on bank interest rate risk. In particular, the research questions whether securitisation is conducive to the optimal hedging of bank interest rate risk, or is merely a funding source enabling these companies to pursue more pro…table, yet riskier, projects
The empirical results reported in this work suggest that banks resorting to asset securitisation do not, on average, achieve an unambiguous reduction in their exposure to the term structure developments. It appears that interest rate risk generally increases with the maturity of assets securitised, with securitisation of long-term assets driving the results.
In addition, banks with very high involvement in the originate-to-distribute market enjoy lower interest rate risk, thereby suggesting an asymmetric U-shape relationship between bank risk and securitisation. This observation, however, does not imply superior risk management practices in these institutions but is merely a result of disintermediation. In particular, I argue that BHCs with high involvement to the market for securitised products function more as brokers, who generate fees by matching the complementary transactions between borrowers and securitised-debt investors, than …nancial intermediaries. Under this "disintermediation" business model, the importance of interest generating revenues declines, and so is the e¤ec-tive duration of assets held on the balance sheet. Accordingly, the duration gap remains at minimal levels, and the intermediary is better protected against term structure developments.
[ computed considering …ve loan categories; the bank's provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total loans (LLP); maturity gap (GAP) calculated as the di¤erence between interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the bank's total assets; the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) NECP purchased by a bank; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; return on assets (ROA); the measure of bank revenue diversi…cation (ROID); and the ratio of the institution's risk-weighted to total assets (TRA). The economic environment is proxied by the annual growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDPG), and the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADSI). ***, **, and * denote statistical signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively for an appropriate mean follows: TSEC is the outstanding principle balance of assets securitised or sold measured as the proportion of total assets; the outstanding balance of securitised long-, medium-, and short-term loans are LT_SEC, MT_SEC, and ST_SEC respectively; the asset growth rate (AGR); equity capital (CAP) calculated as the ratio of BHC's book value of equity capital to its total assets; H_NITR(H_NOIR) is the Herfindahl-Hirschman (non)interest revenue concentration index calculated on the basis of twelve (eight) part breakdown of the (non)interest income; the proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); H_LOAN is the Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index computed considering five loan categories; GAP is the balance sheet maturity gap calculated as the difference between interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities maturing or being repriced within one year, scaled by the bank's total assets; NECP is the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased by a bank; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; ROID is the measure of bank revenue diversification; return on assets is represented by ROA. The regression also includes year-and state-dummies (not reported BHCs reporting at least one securitization transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve System's FY-9C filings are considered. The explanatory variables on the right-hand side are as follows: TSEC is the outstanding principle balance of assets securitized or sold measured as the proportion of total assets; the outstanding balance of securitized long-, medium-, and short-term loans are LT_SEC, MT_SEC, and ST_SEC respectively; the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank's total assets CAP. Each regression also includes year-and state-dummies, and the following firm-specific variables which are not reported: the asset growth rate (AGR); the proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); H_LOAN is the Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index computed considering five loan categories; NECP is the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased by a bank; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is NPL; ROID is the measure of bank revenue diversification; and return on assets is represented by ROA. The regressions in columns 2, 7, and 12 also incorporate the economic environment proxies (not reported) as follows: annual growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDPG), and the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADSI). When the economic environment proxies are added, the time-fixed effect is relaxed. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-values based on White's robust standard error are in italics. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table presents the panel estimation results for the regressions which evaluate the bank holding companies' (BHC) interest rate risk with respect to securitisation, using different time horizons (column "Crisis"); subsamples (columns "SIZE", "LATA", "NDUS"); and the model econometric specifications (column "2SLS"). The dependent variable is the absolute value of the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of BHC i's equity returns to unanticipated changes in the level of the US sovereign zerocoupon yield curve at year t. These coefficients are estimated from a four factor GARCH market model.
Specifically, for each bank-year, I run a four-factor time series regression of BHC weekly returns on the market returns (MRK), and unanticipated changes in yield curve level (LEV), slope (SLO), and curvature (CUR). The estimation requires at least 30 weekly return observations for each bank-year. The corresponding US zero-coupon yield curve level, slope, and curvature are estimated using Diebold and Lee (2006) parameterisation of Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. The unanticipated changes in the yield curve factors at time t are calculated as the difference between the actual changes in these factors and ones forecasted via an appropriate specification of the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. Only BHCs reporting at least one securitisation transaction over the analysed period in Schedule HC-S of the Federal Reserve System's FY-9C filings are considered. Reported are the coefficient estimates for the TSEC explanatory variable, which represents the outstanding principle balance of assets securitised or sold as the proportion of total assets. Each regression also includes year-and statedummies, and the following firm-specific variables which are not reported: the ratio (and the squared ratio) of book value of equity capital to bank's total assets (CAP); the asset growth rate (AGR); the proportion of total assets that are liquid (LATA); the Herfindahl-Hirschman loan concentration index computed considering five loan categories (H_LOAN); the net credit protection (protection bought minus sold) purchased by a bank (NECP); the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL); the measure of bank revenue diversification (ROID); and return on assets (ROA). All BHCs are split into a number of sub-samples on the basis of ranking by the bank's size (column "SIZE"); liquidity (column "LATA"); and net derivative usage (column "NDUS"). 
